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NOTES
DETERMINING THE INTENDED BENEFICIARIES OF THE
ADA IN THE AFTERMATH OF SUTTON: LIMITING THE
APPLICATION OF THE DISABLING CORRECTIONS
COROLLARY
A recent advertisement for athletic shoes shows a young woman
running around a track. As the commercial ends, the camera zooms
out and the viewer is able to see that the woman is running on two
prosthetic limbs.' Until recently, most observers-both laymen and
the judiciary-certainly would have considered this woman
"disabled" and therefore deserving of protection from discrimination
under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). A recent
trilogy of Supreme Court decisions,3 however, suggests otherwise.
In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.," the Supreme Court rejected
the predominant understanding of what constitutes a disability
under the ADA--resolving a split among the circuits 6 -and held
that courts must consider the individual's ability to mitigate or
correct his or her impairment when evaluating whether an
1. Leonard H. Glantz, Disability Definition Mess, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 23, 1999, at A15
(discussing the television advertisement).
2. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994 &
Supp. V 1999); see, e.g., Greene v. New York, No. 95 Civ. 6580, 1998 WL 264838, at *6 n.8
(S.D.N.Y. May 22, 1998) (accepting defendant's stipulation that the plaintiff is disabled
within the meaning of the ADA because she is required to use a prosthetic limb for her
amputated right leg).
3. Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Murphyv. United Parcel Serv.,
Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
4. 527 U.S. at 471.
5. See infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
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individual is entitled to the statute's protections.7 Thus, those
individuals who can utilize "corrective measures"-either artificial
or the body's own-may not be entitled to ADA protection.
Immediately following the decision, the legal community and
popular press perceived the Court's holding as "gutting" the ADA
and rendering it useless in the workplace.8 There is already strong
indication that lower courts are interpreting Sutton in a manner
that severely limits the scope of protection granted to those who use
corrective measures. 9
A closer reading of the Court's decision, however, suggests that
the Court's language may not be as limiting as initially anticipated.
In particular, the Court held that when considering whether an
7. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 4 7 5. Although this Note focuses primarilyonSutton, bothMurphy
and Albertson's provide additional support that the definition of disability under the ADA
includes consideration of mitigating measures. In Murphy, a mechanic was fired from his
position because of high blood pressure. Murphy, 527 U.S. at 518. When unmedicated, the
plaintiffs blood pressure was above the U.S. Department of Transportation's
recommendations for certification. Id. at 519. In his medicated state, however, the plaintiff
could function normally. Id. Following Sutton, the Court evaluated the plaintiff in his
medicated state and held that he was not substantially limited and therefore not disabled
under the ADA. Id. at 521.
"In perhaps the most surprising of these recent decisions, the Court extended its Sutton
decision inAlbertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, finding that whether an individual possesses a
disability within the meaning of the ADA requires consideration of ... measures undertaken,
whether consciously or not, with the body's own systems." Diane L. Kimberlin & Linda
Ottinger Headley, ADA Overview and Update: What Has the Supreme Court Done to
Disability Law?, 19 REV. LrTG. 579,588-89 (2000) (footnotes omitted). Thus, inAlbertson's,
the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision that monocular vision is a per se disability
and held that a plaintiffs ability to make subconscious physical adjustments must be
considered in assessing whether the individual is disabled under the ADA. Albertson's, 527
U.S. at 565-66.
8. Indeed, the popular press suggested that individuals with diabetes, cancer, and
amputated limbs were no longer protected by the ADA. See, e.g., Jan Crawford Greenburg,
Ruling Trims the Scope of Disability Law: High Court Excludes Correctable Impairments
from Job Protection, Cin. TRIB., June 23, 1999, at 1, available at 1999 WL 2886114. But see
Lauren J. McGarity, Note, Disabling Corrections and Correctable Disabilities: Why Side
Effects Might be the Saving Grace of Sutton, 109 YALEL.J. 1161,1162 (2000) (suggesting that
the widespread perception that the ADA was powerless in the workplace may be incorrect
due to the disabling corrections corollary); Susan B. Egan, Those with Corrected Disabilities
Still Protected byADAAfter "Sutton," N.Y.L.J., Nov. 12,1999, at 1 (arguing that individuals
with fully corrected disabilities are still protected under the "regarded as" prong of the ADA).
9. See, e.g., Todd v. Academy Corp., 57 F. Supp. 2d 448, 454 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (holding
that plaintiffs epilepsy condition, as treated by medication, did not constitute a disability);
Taylor v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Tex., Inc. 55 F. Supp. 2d 604, 611 (N.D. Tex. 1999)
(dismissing the plaintiffs claim because sleep apnea is fully corrected by nasal CPAP).
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individual is "'substantially limited' in a major life activity and thus
disabled under the [ADA]," it is imperative to evaluate the
effects-"both positive and negative"-of the corrective measures.1"
Notably, the Court emphasized that evaluating individuals in their
mitigated or corrected state is the only way to permit courts to
"consider any negative side effects suffered by an individual
resulting from the use of mitigating measures."1 Sutton therefore
suggests a "disabling corrections" corollary: 2 individuals who use
corrective measures for an otherwise nondisabling mental or
physical impairment, and who have disabling negative side effects,
may require ADA protection. 3
As the next wave of post-Sutton ADA litigation begins, courts are
going to be faced with plaintiffs who invoke the "disabling
corrections" language in Sutton to argue that the side effects of
their corrective measures are disabling.' Sutton, however, fails to
address the scope of the disabling corrections corollary. Strict
adherence to the language in Sutton would mandate accepting the
claims of a wide range of potential plaintiffs. "Individuals who take
medications that cause extreme drowsiness, nausea, or other
severe side effects would be appropriately considered 'individuals
with disabilities' under [Sutton], as would individuals who have
had corrective surgeries, such as colostomies or hysterectomies,
that give rise to permanently disabling conditions." 5 If courts
strictly adhere to the language in Sutton, however, an absurd
anomaly arises. On the one hand, individuals who are not
otherwise disabled, but take corrective measures for nondisabling
10. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
11. Id. at 484.
12. See McGarity, supra note 8, at 1163-64 (definingthe "disabling corrections" corollary).
13. See id. McGarity suggests that the disabling corrections corollary will help mitigate
the Supreme Court's restrictive view of disability in Sutton by providing individuals an
additional avenue to obtain the protections of the ADA. On the contrary, this Note argues
that this group of plaintiffs was not an intended beneficiary of the ADA when it was drafted
and, therefore, is not entitled to ADA protection. For a more extensive discussion, see infra
notes 124-36 and accompanying text.
14. See McGarity, supra note 8, at 1163 (arguing that the next wave of post-Sutton
litigation "will undoubtedly encounter both (1) plaintiffs who argue that their corrective
measures are imperfect' and (2) plaintiffs who invoke the 'disabling corrections' language in
Sutton to argue that the side effects of their corrective measures substantially limit a major
life activity").
15. Id.
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impairments, may receive protection under the ADA if they suffer
from negative side effects.1" On the other hand, individuals who are
otherwise disabled (e.g., individuals with diabetes), but are able to
mitigate the effects of their impairment, will be barred from
coverage. Surely, Congress never intended such a result when it
enacted the ADA.'"
This Note argues that a narrow construction of the disabling
corrections alluded to in Sutton most consistently supports the
legislative history and congressional intent of the ADA. In
particular, courts should not engage in the disabling corrections
analysis unless the plaintiff would be disabled in his unmedicated
or uncorrected state. If the plaintiff fulfills this threshold
requirement, the court may then evaluate both the positive and
negative side effects of the corrective measure to assess whether the
individual is "substantially limited" in a major life activity and thus
disabled under the ADA. Such an approach has the advantage of
balancing the ADA's explicit goal of encouraging individuals with
disabilities to participate in the workplace without fear of
discrimination, while at the same time fulfilling the goal of both
employers and the Court of minimizing trivial, unwarranted
litigation.
16. For example, an individual with mild obesity may take medication to help control his
weight. This medication can have side effects including nausea, headaches, and slight
dizziness. Under a strict literal interpretation of Sutton, this individual may be considered
disabled due to the side effects of his medication. His underlying problem (mild obesity),
however, is not considered a disability under the ADA. See 2 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
COMPLIANCE MANUAL (CBC) § 902.2(c)(5)(ii) (1995) (articulating that"[b]eing overweight, in
and of itself, generally is not an impairment"). It seems wholly inconsistent with the intent
of the drafters that this otherwise nondisabled individual receive the protection of the ADA,
while an individual who requires the use of prosthetic limbs may not be protected because
he is able to compensate for his impairment.
17. Congress reported thatindividuals withdisabilities"occupyan inferior status... and
are severely disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally .... " 42
U.S.C. § 12101(a)(6) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). In a related finding, Congress stipulated that
"individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority" and thus would qualify as
a suspect classification for equal protection purposes. Id. § 12101(a)(7). Adopting a broad
interpretation of the disabling corrections corollary, thereby protecting individuals who are
not otherwise disabled but who suffer side effects from medication, is not consistent with
these congressional findings. For further discussion of how the disabling corrections corollary
can be implemented consistently with the congressional purpose of the ADA, see infra notes
124-36 and accompanying text.
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This Note contains three sections. The first summarizes the
history of the ADA, along with the framework and rationale
supporting its enactment. Moreover, this section focuses on the
ADA's definition of "disability," paying particular attention to the
impact of mitigating measures litigation on the evolution of its
definition. The next section analyzes the "disabling corrections"
language in Sutton and the subsequent case law that has examined
the corollary, arguing that a narrow interpretation of the disabling
corrections corollary best serves both the Supreme Court's goals in
Sutton and the legislative intent of the ADA. The third section
suggests that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) should promulgate regulations under title I of the ADA
endorsing a narrow construction of the disabling corrections
language in Sutton. ' Furthermore, this final section discusses the
importance ofjudicial deference to the proposed EEOC regulations,
as the ADA is "ambiguous with respect to the [disabling corrections]
issue" 19 and the proposed EEOC regulations are "a permissible
construction of the statute."20
THE ADA DEFINITION OF "DISABILITY"
The History, Framework, and Rationale of the ADA 2'
In 1973, with the enactment of the Rehabilitation Act,22 the
federal government ushered in an era of legislation targeted at
eliminating discrimination against the disabled. The Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 provides that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with
a disability ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
18. The ADA delegates authority to promulgate regulations to different federal agencies.
The EEOC is authorized to issue regulations governing title I of the Act regulating private
employment discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1994). Because the focus of this Note is
on title I of the ADA, the recommended regulations are directed at the EEOC.
19. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
20. Id.
21. For an extensive discussion of the origins, history, and framework of the ADA, see
Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of
a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 415-34 (1991).
22. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 335 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. (1994)).
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subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance ....... Although the Rehabilitation Act
was meaningful legislation, it failed to eliminate a significant
aspect of discrimination based on disability-discrimination in the
private employment context-because it only applied to federal
government agencies and businesses that received federal
government funding.24 In response to growing concern over the
failure of the Rehabilitation Act to eliminate discrimination in
private employment, Congress passed the Americans with
Disabilities Act in 1990.25 Congress intended the ADA to broaden
the scope of the Rehabilitation Act and extend protection to the
private sector.26 Moreover, in his remarks at the White House
signing ceremony, President Bush described the ADA as "an
'historic new civil rights Act ... the world's first comprehensive
declaration of equality for people with disabilities."27 Indeed, the
ADA is intended "to provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals
with disabilities."28
The ADA is divided into five subchapter titles: I-Employment;
II-Public Services; III-Public Accommodations and Services
operated by Private Entities; IV-Telecommunications Relay
Services; and V-Miscellaneous Provisions.29 Title I of the Act, aimed
specifically at eliminating discrimination in the workplace,
prohibits discrimination "against a qualified individual with a
disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to
job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge
23. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994).
24. For a discussion of the scope of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, see BRIAN DOYLE,
DISABILITY, DISCRIMINATION AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES: A COMPARATIvE STUDY OF THE
EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS OF DISABLED PERSONS 81-89 (1995).
25. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990).
26. Elizabeth A. Chang, Note, Who Should Have It Both Ways?: The Role of Mitigating
Measures in an ADA Analysis, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 1123, 1126 (1998) (maintaining that the
"ADA expands the protections provided by the Rehabilitation Act into the private sector,
state and local governmental agencies, and the Senate").
27. Burgdorf, supra note 21, at 413-14 (quoting President George Bush, Remarks during
the Ceremony for the Signing of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 2 (July 26,
1990)).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994).
29. Id. §§ 12111-12213. This Note focuses primarily on discrimination in the workplace
and therefore focuses on title I of the ADA. Title I is codified at id. §§ 12111-12117.
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of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment."3" Therefore, an
employee who intends to assert a claim under the ADA faces the
threshold question of whether he is disabled within the meaning of
the statute. Unlike prior civil rights laws, however, the intended
beneficiaries of the ADA are neither discrete nor well-defined.3 '
Defining Disability under the ADA 2
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination and to be
entitled to protection under title I of the ADA, a plaintiff must
prove that he is disabled, that he is otherwise qualified for the job,
and that he has been discriminated against "because of" his
disability.3 The existence of a disability can be established in one
of several methods, 3 but the principle method requires a three-step
process.35 First, the court must consider whether the condition
constitutes a physical or mental impairment. 6 Second, the court
30. Id. § 12112(a).
31. See McGarity, supra note 8, at 1166.
32. In defining the term "disabled" in the ADA, Congress piggybacked on the existing
Rehabilitation Act definition. Congress was hesitant to alter the definition of "disabled"
within the ADA and, therefore, the term is defined exactly as it is in the Rehabilitation
Act-except that the phrase "handicapped person" was changed to "disability." See Bragdon
v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998). Additionally, title V of the ADA provides that previous
Rehabilitation Act case law interpreting the term "disabled" would apply to the ADA. See id.
33. See, e.g., Moritz v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 147 F.3d 784, 786 (8th Cir. 1998); Gordon
v. E.L. Hamm & Assocs., Inc., 100 F.3d 907,910 (11th Cir. 1996); see also Brian T. Rabineau,
Note, Those with Disabilities Take Heed. Eighth Circuit Suggests thatADA May Not Protect
Those Who Fail to Control a Controllable Disability, 65 MO. L. REv. 319, 322 (2000)
(reiterating that plaintiffs must establish all three aspects of the test to maintain a prima
facie case of discrimination).
34. The ADA defines disability as"(A) a physical or mentalimpairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an
impairment; or (C) being regardedas having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). This
Note addresses solely the first definition of disability, paying particular attention to how the
disabling corrections corollary meshes with the "substantially limits" aspect of the definition.
35. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 631 (promulgating a three-step process to determine
whether a plaintiffhas a disability pursuant to the ADA).
36. See id. The "physical or mental impairment" and "major life activity" prongs of the
test are not the focus ofthis Note. The EEOC regulations define the term "physical or mental
impairment" as a"physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical
loss affecting one ... of the ... body systems," or"[any mental or physiological disorder." 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2001). The regulations also define major life activities as "functions such
as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
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must identify the plaintiff's life activity and determine if it qualifies
as a "major life activity" under the ADA. 7 Finally, the court must
assess whether the plaintiffs impairment substantially limits the
major life activity." Aside from occasional inquiry and debate, the
courts have analyzed the first two prongs consistently. In contrast,
the third prong resulted in "a firestorm of controversy,"" a split
among the federal circuit courts,40 and voluminous litigation.
Agency Interpretations4 '
The authority to issue regulations to implement the ADA is split
primarily between three government agencies.42 The EEOC was
granted authority to issue regulations to carry out the employment
provisions in title I of the ADA.4" "No agency, however, [was
delegated the] authority to issue regulations implementing the
generally applicable provisions of the ADA ... which fall outside
Titles I-V."" Despite its apparent lack of authority, the EEOC
breathing, learning, and working." Id. § 1630.2(i).
37. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 631.
38. See id.; EEOC v. R.J. Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d 645, 652 (5th Cir. 1999).
39. Rabineau, supra note 33, at 323.
40. See infra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.
41. For a discussion of the EEOC interpretive regulations that accompany the definition
of disability, see Timothy Stewart Bland, The Determination of Disability Under the ADA-
Should Mitigating Factors Such as Medications Be Considered?, 35 IDAHO L. REV. 265, 272-
73 (1999); Erica Worth Harris, Controlled Impairments Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act: A Search for the Meaning of "Disability", 73 WASH. L. REV. 575, 578-84
(1998); Jonathan Bridges, Note, Mitigating Measures Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act: Interpretation and Deference in the Judicial Process, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061,1061-
62 (1999); Chang, supra note 26, at 1134-35; Sheryl Rebecca Kamholz, Note, The Americans
with Disabilities Act: Advocating Judicial Deference to the EEOCs Mitigating Measures
Guidelines, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 99,104-05 (1998); Rabineau, supra note 33, at 323-24; Susan
E. Dallas, Sutton: Use ofMitigatingMeasures to Determine Disability Under the ADA, COLO.
LAW., Mar. 1999, at 59.
42. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 478 (1999). While Congress
granted the EEOC authority to issue regulations for title I of the ADA, it granted the
Attorney General the authority to issue regulations with respect to title II, subtitle A, which
relates to public services. 42 U.S.C. § 12134 (1994). Additionally, Congress granted the
Secretary of Transportation authority to issue regulations pertinent to the transportation
provisions of titles II and III. Id. § 12149(a).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 12116 ("Not later than 1 year after [the date of enactment of this Act], the
Commission shall issue regulations ... to carry out this subchapter .... ").
44. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 479. The generally applicable provisions-42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-
12102-include the definition of "disability."
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promulgated interpretive guidelines to its regulations defining the
term "disability" in the context of employment.45 In particular, the
EEOC regulations expand on two of the necessary components of
the statutory definition of disability: (1) whether a "physical or
mental impairment" exists; and (2) whether the impairment
"substantially limits" a major life activity."6 In both instances, the
EEOC regulations indicate that the determination of whether an
individual is disabled should be made on a case-by-case basis
"'without regard to mitigating measures such as medicines, or
assistive or prosthetic devices."" 7 Despite the EEOC's clear
interpretation of what constitutes a disability, the federal courts
remained divided until Sutton.
Early Case Law on Mitigating Measures
Prior to the 1999 Supreme Court term, there. was significant
disagreement among the federal circuits as to whether mitigating
measures should be considered when determining whether an
individual met the ADA's definition of disability. 8 Eight circuits
adopted the EEOC position whereby an individual's disability
status is evaluated in his or her unmedicated or uncorrected state. 9
This majority position was grounded in both the EEOC regulations
and the legislative intent of the statute. In fact, "[a] review of the
45. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(2001). The Department ofJustice (DOJ) has also issued similar
interpretive guidelines. The DOJ guidelines stipulate "whether a person has a disability
should be assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating measures, such as
reasonable modification or auxiliary aids and services." 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, § 35.104.
46. See Chang, supra note 26, at 1134 (describing the two sections of the EEOC
interpretive guidelines that discuss the definition of disability).
47. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 502 (quoting 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2Q)).
48. See Michael J. Puma, Note, Respecting the Plain Language of the ADA: A Textualist
Argument Rejecting the EEOC's Analysis of Controlled Disabilities, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
123, 126-40 (1998) (discussing the split among the courts concerning whether mitigating
measures should be considered in the determination of disability).
49. Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 156 F.3d 321, 329 (2d Cir. 1998);
Washington v. HCA Health Servs., 152 F.3d 464, 470-71 (5th Cir. 1998); Baert v. Euclid
Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626,629-30 (7th Cir. 1998); Arnoldv. United Parcel Serv., 136 F.3d
854,863 (lst Cir. 1998); Matczakv. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 937 (3d
Cir. 1997); Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 1997); Harris v. H & W
Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516,520-21 (11th Cir. 1996); Holihanv. Lucky Stores, 87 F.3d 362,
366 (9th Cir. 1996).
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relevant House and Senate reports reveals that the EEOC's
mitigating measures guideline is consistent with the Act's
legislative history."" House Report No. 101-485 states that whether
an individual has a disability should be assessed without regard to
the availability of mitigating measures. 51 Moreover, Senate Report
No. 101-116 provides that "whether a person has a disability should
be assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating
measures, such as reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids."52
In addition, some of the courts that adopted the EEOC's position
recognized the traditional rule of judicial deference to agency
interpretation when the statutory language is ambiguous and the
agency's interpretation was reasonable.
5 3
Conversely, prior to Sutton, two circuits adopted the position that
individuals should be evaluated in their mitigated or corrected state
when assessing whether they were disabled within the meaning of
the ADA.5" These courts based their rejection of the EEOC
guidelines primarily on their concern that the EEOC's position
required courts to engage in imaginative judicial inquiry by
assessing individuals in their uncorrected state. 5 The lower courts
adopting the medicated approach also indicated that the EEOC's
interpretive guidance for its regulations was relatively weak
authority, and that agency deference was not required because the
guidelines were contrary to the plain, unambiguous language of the
statute.5" As the Tenth Circuit wrote, courts should be concerned
50. Kamholz, supra note 41, at 108.
51. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 334.
52. S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989).
53. See Wilson v. Pennsylvania State Police Dep't, 964 F. Supp. 898, 904-05 (E.D. Pa.
1997) (accepting the EEOC's view as a reasonable interpretation of the statute and as
supported by legislative history); Sicard v. City of Sioux City, 950 F. Supp. 1420, 1435-38
(N.D. Iowa 1996) (same). For a thorough discussion of the concept of judicial deference to
agency interpretation, see infra notes 155-63 and accompanying text.
54. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 902 (10th Cir. 1997), affd, 527
U.S. 471 (1999); Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 767 (6th Cir. 1997). The Fifth
Circuit also indicated that, despite its preference for the medicated approach, it felt bound
by the EEOC's interpretation of the statute. HCA Health Servs., 152 F.3d at 470. The Fourth
Circuit did not address the issue prior to Sutton.
55. McGarity, supra note 8, at 1169 (referring to the Colorado District Court's analysis
in Sutton, which the Tenth Circuit subsequently affirmed).
56. Sutton, 130 F.3d at 902 (rejecting the EEOC's interpretive guidance as contrary to
the plain language of the ADA); Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., 963 F. Supp. 102, 107-
1274 [Vol. 43:1265
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"with whether the impairment affects the individual in fact, not
whether it would hypothetically affect the individual without the
use of corrective measures."
57
Resolving the Circuit Court Split-Sutton v. United Air Lines,
Inc.
In June 1999, the United States Supreme Court announced three
opinions that changed the way "disability" is defined under the
ADA.58 In these cases, the Court affirmed that inquiries about
whether an individual is disabled, and thus deserves the protection
of the ADA, must be done on a case-by-case basis.5 9 More
importantly, the Court held that, when assessing whether an
individual is disabled, the Court should consider individuals in
their corrected or mitigated state.' These decisions were
paramount, not only because they made proving disability status
far more difficult, but also because they contradicted the more
commonly held notion that disability should be considered without
corrective or mitigating measures.61
In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.-the leading decision in the
1999 trilogy-the Supreme Court was faced with determining
whether twin sisters, who had severe myopia causing them to see
20/200 in their right eyes and 20/400 in their left eyes when
08 (D.R.I. 1997) (same); Moore v. City of Overland Park, 950 F. Supp. 1081, 1088 (D. Kan.
1996) (same).
57. Sutton, 130 F.3d at 902.
58. See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text.
59. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999) (maintaining that whether
a person has a disability under the ADArequires an individualized inquiry); see also Allison
Duncan, Note, DefiningDisability in theADA Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 60 LA. L. REV.
967 (2000) (reporting that the Court held that disabilities must be considered on a case-by-
case basis).
60. For a lengthy discussion of the Sutton decision, including analysis of the holding and
its potentially controversial future impacts, see Andrew Tuch, Disability & ADA- Supreme
Court Clarifies the Meaning of Disability UnderADA, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 275 (1999); see
also Julia J. Hall, Note, Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.: The Role of Mitigating Measures in
Determining Disabilities, 51 MERCER L. REV. 799 (2000) (providing a thorough discussion of
Sutton and the legal framework embodied in the decision); Linda Greenhouse, High Court
Limits Who Is Protected by Disability Law, N.Y. TIMES ABSTRACTS, June, 23, 1999, at 1
(summarizing the decision and articulating the immediate response in the aftermath of the
decision), available at 1999 WL 30524172.
61. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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uncorrected, were disabled within the meaning of the ADA.62 The
petitioners, Karen Sutton and Kimberly Hinton, applied to United
Airlines (United) for positions as commercial airline pilots.63
Although the petitioners met United's age, education, experience,
and FAA certification requirements, the company refused to hire
them because the petitioners did not meet their minimum vision
requirements.64 Subsequently, the petitioners sued United in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, alleging that United
discriminated against them on the basis of their disabilities in
violation of the ADA.65
In support of their contention that they deserved protection
under the ADA, the petitioners argued that their myopia
significantly interfered with their ability to engage in the major life
activity of working.66 Moreover, they claimed that the court should
follow the EEOC guidelines and determine their disability status in
an uncorrected state. The District Court of Colorado dismissed the
petitioners' complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief
could be granted.68 The court reasoned that the petitioners were not
disabled under the meaning of the ADA because their vision
impairment was fully correctable and therefore they were not
substantially limited in the major life activity of working.69
Employing similar logic, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the District
Court's decision.70
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the tension
between the Courts of Appeals regarding whether mitigating
measures should be considered in assessing an individual's
disability status.7" By a seven to two vote, the Court affirmed the
Tenth Circuit's decision, thereby rejecting the position of both the
62. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 476. Bothwomenwere initially invited for an interview butwere later informed
by United that they did not meet United's minimum vision requirement of 20/100
uncorrected vision and therefore were ineligible for employment.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 481.
68. Id. at 476.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 477.
71. Id.
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majority of the federal Courts of Appeals and the EEOC
interpretive guidelines. 2 The majority opinion, crafted by Justice
O'Connor, rested on three grounds. 3
First, the Court concluded that strict literal interpretation of the
term "substantially limits" requires that the individual be
evaluated in their mitigated state. The Court determined that
because the language is in the present indicative verb form, it
requires that the "person be presently-not potentially or
hypothetically-substantially limited in order to demonstrate a
disability. A 'disability' exists only where an impairment
'substantially limits' a major life activity, not where it 'might,'
'could,' or 'would' be substantially limiting if mitigating measures
were not taken."74 Because Sutton and Hinton had perfect vision
with their corrective eyeglasses, they were not disabled within the
meaning of the Act.
Second, because the ADA "requires that disabilities be evaluated
'with respect to an individual' and be determined based on whether
the impairment substantially limits the 'major life activities of such
individual,"" the ADA demands an individualized inquiry. The
Court, therefore, concluded that the EEOC interpretive guidelines
were inconsistent with an individualized inquiry because evaluating
an individual in his corrected state would require reliance on
general medical information and speculation. 6
Finally, in denying the petitioners' claim, the Court relied heavily
on Congress's findings that, at the time of the Act's enactment,
forty-three million Americans had disabilities. The Court decided
72. The Court's decision to deny the Sutton sisters ADA protection makes sense because
the twin sisters suffered from a minor, albeit easily corrected, impairment. Therefore, as
applied to the individualized facts, the mitigating measures (eyeglasses) were successful in
fully compensating the women. Future courts, however, will be challenged with more
complex and difficult "disability" assessments as a result of this decision. For example, do
radiation and chemotherapy treatments fully mitigate the disabling effects of cancer? This
Note suggests that when faced with difficult assessments, the courts should narrowly
construe the impacts of mitigating measures, both positive and negative, to ensure Sutton
protects the intended beneficiaries of the ADA.
73. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 481-89 (discussing each of the three reasons for affirming the
Tenth Circuit's decision).
74. Id. at 482.
75. Id. at 483 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)) (emphasis added).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 484.
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that following the EEOC interpretive guidelines, and thus
considering individuals in the absence of mitigating measures,
would contradict Congress's findings because it would increase the
number of disabled persons to over 160 million.78
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Stevens argued that "customary
tools of statutory construction" support the idea that "whether an
individual is 'disabled' within the meaning of the Act ... [requires
consideration] without regard to mitigation that has resulted from
rehabilitation, self-improvement, prosthetic devices, or
medication."71 Moreover, he asserted that "in order to be faithful to
the remedial purpose of the Act, [it should be given] generous,
rather than miserly, construction."8 ° Stevens stressed that all of the
agency interpretations, 81 and the clear legislative history of the
ADA and its precursor-the Rehabilitation Act-support assessing
individuals in their uncorrected state. 82 Furthermore, the dissent
rejected the majority's concern that an individualized inquiry would
require courts to speculate about a person's hypothetical
condition.8" Finally, Stevens contended that even if the number of
intended beneficiaries exceeded Congress's findings, the Court's
reasoning did not justify such a restrictive construction of the Act.84
Despite Justice Stevens' dissent, however, the Supreme Court
78. Id. at 484-88 (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1)). Justice O'Connor relied on
information in a law review article to approximate the number of disabled Americans. See
Burgdorf, supra note 21, at 434 n.117.
79. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 495 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 496 (asserting that all three of the Executive agencies that issued regulations
or interpretive bulletins stipulated that assessing whether an individual is disabled requires
evaluating them in their uncorrected state).
82. See id. at 496-503. "All of the [legislative] Reports, indeed, are replete with references
to the understanding that the Act's protected class includes individuals with various medical
conditions that ordinarily are perfectly 'correctable' with medication or treatment." Id. at
501. Additionally, Justice Stevens argued that there are really two parts to the analysis of
whether mitigating measures should be considered. The dissent distinguished between
people "Congress unquestionably intended to cover" and individuals with "minor, trivial
impairment[s]." Id. at 495-96. More importantly, the dissent asserted that the majority's
fears about expansive, trivial ADA litigation could be eliminated if the court adopted the
same distinction. Id. The dissent believed that individuals "Congress unquestionably
intended to cover" are deserving of a broad interpretation of the Act's protections and
therefore should be evaluated in their nonmitigated state. Id. at 495.
83. Id. at 508.
84. Id.
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adopted the mitigating measure approach, and thereby opened the
door to litigation based on the disabling corrections corollary.
SUTTON'S "DISABLING CORRECTIONS COROLLARY"
Prior to Sutton, courts treated certain conditions as almost per se
disabilities.85 In Sutton, however, the Court rejected categorical
classifications and instead held that the determination of whether
an individual has a disability under the ADA is a highly
individualized inquiry. 6 More importantly, the Supreme Court held
that each individualized inquiry requires an examination of the
individual in his corrected state such that "the effects of those
measures-both positive and negative-must be taken into account
when judging whether that person is 'substantially limited' in a
major life activity and thus 'disabled' under the Act."" Indeed, the
Court emphasized that adopting the EEOC approach, thereby
evaluating individuals in their uncorrected or unmitigated state,
would force employers and courts to speculate about a person's
condition and make disability determinations based on general,
rather than individualized information.' The Court reasoned that
viewing disabilities in their corrected state was the only way to
"consider any negative side effects suffered by an individual
resulting from the use of mitigating measures, even when those
side effects are very severe."8 9
By embracing the mitigating measures approach, the Court
created an important corollary to the "rule" that individuals who
can control their disability through the use of corrective devices or
85. In Bragdon v. Abbott, for example, the Supreme Court held that a woman with
asymptomatic HIV was disabled under the ADA because she was "substantially limited" in
the major life activity of reproduction. 524 U.S. 624 (1998). Although the Court espoused an
individual inquiry into each individual's circumstances, the language in the decision hinted
that any individual with asymptomatic HIV would be substantially limited in the major life
activity of reproduction, and therefore disabled. In addition, in other cases, individuals with
impairments including blindness, mental retardation, insulin-dependent diabetes, and severe
epilepsy or hypertension were categorically considered disabled. KAREN H. HENRY, ADA- 10
STEPS TO COMPLIANCE (1999).
86. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483.
87. Id. at 482.
88. Id. at 483.
89. Id. at 484.
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medications are generally not entitled to the protections of the
ADA.9" Sutton suggests that individuals who use corrective
measures for a mental or physical impairment, and who have
negative side effects, require ADA protection. Under this regime,
courts are tasked with evaluating not only the underlying physical
or mental impairment, but the side effects resulting from corrective
devices or medications. 91
The adoption of the disabling corrections corollary leads to many
questions concerning its scope. Should individuals who are not
otherwise disabled under the ADA gain protection from the Act
because they use corrective devices or medications that result in
negative side effects? 92 "How severe must a side effect be before it
should be considered disabling? Should severe but temporary side
effects be considered disabilities for the purpose of the ADA?"93 In
Sutton the Supreme Court did not address, let alone provide
answers to, these questions.
In the aftermath of Sutton, lower courts likewise have failed to
resolve any of these difficult questions.94 In the few decisions after
Sutton addressing the side effects of mitigating measures, the
courts have acknowledged Sutton's disabling corrections language,
but have failed to meaningfully apply it.9" Two prominent Courts of
90. One commentator maintained that adopting the disabling corrections corollary could
be the "saving grace" of the Sutton decision if it is interpreted broadly. See McGarity, supra
note 8, at 1173. Indeed, she argues that "the disabling corrections corollary helps to ensure
that the Sutton decision will clarify, not destroy, the protections of the ADA." Id.
91. In Sutton, this determination was straightforward because wearing eyeglasses does
not lead to noticeable, detrimental side effects. In other cases, however, this determination
may be far more complicated. For example, it is significantly more difficult to assess the
ramifications from chemotherapy treatments (nausea, loss of weight, loss of hair) for cancer
patients.
92. In other words, should the disabling corrections corollary extend beyond correctable
disabilities cases?
93. McGarity, supra note 8, at 1175.
94. The difficulty in resolving these issues is compounded by the limited precedent
available to guide courts' analyses. Prior to Sutton, eight circuits required courts to assess
an individual's impairment in its unmitigated or uncorrected state. See supra note 49. Under
such a regime the court's sole responsibility was assessing whether the underlying
impairment was a disability, not the potentially disabling impacts of treatment.
95. See, e.g., Belk v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 194 F.3d 946 (8th Cir. 1999); Taylor v.
Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296 (3rd Cir. 1999); EEOC v. R.J. Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d
645 (5th Cir. 1999); Arnold v. City of Appleton, 97 F. Supp. 2d 937 (E.D. Wis. 2000); Popko
v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 84 F. Supp. 2d 589 (M.D. Pa. 2000); Marasovich v. Prairie
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Appeals' decisions highlight the lower courts' reluctance to resolve
issues pertaining to the scope of the disabling corrections corollary.
In EEOC v. R.J. Gallagher Co.,96 the plaintiff was diagnosed with
myeldosplastic syndrome (MDS), a type of blood cancer." After the
plaintiff underwent thirty days of chemotherapy, his doctor
indicated that the cancer had gone into "complete remission" and
that the plaintiff could return to work without limitation." Upon
returning to work the plaintiff assured his supervisor that he could
continue his duties as president, but that he would have to continue
to undergo chemotherapy sessions." Moreover, he offered to
minimize the impact of the chemotherapy by scheduling the
sessions on weekends.' 0 His supervisor, howevei, expressed doubt
that the plaintiff could continue to work after being treated for
cancer, and subsequently demoted him to vice-president of sales,
resulting in a fifty-percent cut in salary.'0 ' Relying on the fact that
the plaintiffs cancer was in complete remission, the Fifth Circuit
held that the plaintiffwas not substantially limited in the major life
activity of working.0 2
The court's assessment, however, is made without any mean-
ingful consideration of "the side effects of [the plaintiffs]
treatment."'03 The Fifth Circuit's reluctance to address the
disabling corrections corollary is evident in its illusory analysis of
the side effects of the plaintiffs chemotherapy. The court found that
Material Sales, No. 98 C 2070, 1999 WL 1101244 (N.D. M. Dec. 1, 1999); Rolffv. Interim
Personnel, Inc., No. 2:99CV44, 1999 WL 1095768 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 4, 1999); Todd v. Academy
Corp., 57 F. Supp. 2d 448 (S.D. Tex. 1999); Davis v. Computer Maint. Serv., Inc., No. O1A01-
9809-CV00459, 1999 WL 767597 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 1999).
96. 181 F.3d at 645.
97. Id. at 648.
98. Id. at 649.
99. Id.
100. Id. The plaintiffwas required to receive monthly chemotherapy sessions lasting three
to five days, meaning that he would be required to miss one to three days if he scheduled the
treatments on weekends. Id. at 654.
101. Id. at 649.
102. Id. at 655.
103. Id. at654. The courtmentionedthatthe disabilityassessmentrequires consideration
of both the actual effects of the cancer, and the side effects of the medical treatment. Id. The
absence of any substantive analysis of the plaintiffs side effects (particularly the physical
side effects), however, suggests their resistance to address the scope of the disabling
corrections corollary. Specifically, the court could have addressed how the duration and
severity of side effects should be considered.
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the side effects from his treatment were isolated to the fact that the
plaintiff would be required to miss a few days of work each month
for treatment. 0 4 More importantly, the court failed to evaluate the
physical side effects of the plaintiff's chemotherapy treatments
-nausea, weakness, and weight loss-that could have limited his
ability to work.
Similarly, in Taylor v. Phoenixville School District,10 a decision
issued before Sutton, the Third Circuit held that a former secretary
for a school district was disabled because in her unmedicated state
her bipolar disorder substantially limited her work.' 6 The plaintiff
worked for the defendant for twenty years and received exemplary
performance appraisals prior to the onset of her disorder. 107 After
being admitted to a psychiatric institution and receiving treatment
with Lithium and Navane to control her disorder, the plaintiff was
released to return to work.' Over the following year, the plaintiff
received numerous disciplinary notices, experienced difficulties
adapting to additional personal responsibilities and the school's
new computer system, and subsequently was discharged.0 9 In its
decision, the Third Circuit held that the plaintiff was disabled
because her mental disorder resulted in serious delusions and
paranoia, which substantially impaired her ability to think.110
In light of Sutton, however, the Third Circuit granted a panel
rehearing and revisited whether the plaintiffs bipolar disorder was
substantially limiting in her corrected state."' In rejecting the
defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court held that
there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
plaintiff was disabled under the ADA." Additionally, the court
remanded the case because the facts suggested that the plaintiffs
104. Id.
105. 174 F.3d 142 (3d Cir. 1999), opinion amended on rehg and remanded, 184 F.3d 296
(3d Cir. 1999).
106. Id. at 156.
107. Id. at 148.
108. Id. at 148-49.
109. Id. at 149-50.
110. Id. at 156.
111. Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 302 (3d Cir. 1999).
112. Id. at 306.
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medication did not fully control her symptoms, as evidenced by her
numerous visits to the doctor despite her limited income."'
Despite what appears to be a more meaningful application of the
disabling corrections corollary, the Third Circuit also bypassed an
opportunity to solidify its scope. Although acknowledging that
Lithium and Navane have severe side effects,"' some of which
manifested in the plaintiff, the court was reluctant to find that the
negative side effects of her medication were independently
disabling." 5 Instead, the court continued to analyze her disability
in terms of whether the medication could fully correct her
impairment. Although the court's decision is consistent with Sutton,
it bypassed the opportunity to further define the expansiveness of
the disabling corrections corollary." 6
Both of these decisions, like Sutton, involved plaintiffs with
correctable disabilities." 7 Therefore, the courts' analysis of miti-
gating measures mirrors Sutton and is limited to whether the
corrective device completely or perfectly alleviates the individual's
impairment. If the court finds that the corrective device successfully
mitigates the impairment, the individual who would otherwise be
disabled is no longer substantially limited in a major life activity.
113. Id. at 308 (indicating that the plaintiff saw the doctor twenty-five times even though
she earned only a secretary's salary, cared for a disabled child, and each visit cost $120).
114. The court found that "when the amount of lithium in the blood is near and above the
therapeutic range, side effects can include nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, slight tremor,
lethargy, impaired concentration, dizziness, slurred speech, ataxia, muscle weakness, and
nystagmus." Id. at 303 n.1.
115. See id. at 308-09.
116. The Third Circuit's determination, although inconclusive, supports this Note's
premise that the disabling corrections corollary should be interpreted narrowly. See id.
117. See Taylor, 184 F.3d at 296; EEOC v. R.J. Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d 645 (5th Cir. 1999).
Correctable disabilities refer to physical or mental impairments that would be considered
disabilities in their uncorrected state. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S.471, 482
(1999). Indeed, the post-Sutton disabling corrections decisions have almost exclusively
involved plaintiffs with correctable disabilities. See, e.g., Belkv. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
194 F.3d 946 (8th Cir. 1999) (polio); Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296 (3rd Cir.
1999) (bipolar disorder); EEOC v. R.J. Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d 645 (5th Cir. 1999) (cancer);
Arnold v. City of Appleton, 97 F. Supp. 2d 937 (E.D. Wis. 2000) (epilepsy); Popko v.
Pennsylvania State Univ., 84 F. Supp. 2d 589 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (idiopathic epilepsy); Rolffv.
Interim Personnel, Inc., No. 2:99CV44,1999 WL 1095768 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 4,1999) (Hepatitis
C); Toddv. Academy Corp., 57 F. Supp. 2d 448 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (epilepsy); Davis v. Computer
Maint. Serv., Inc.,No. 01A01-9809-CV00459,1999WL 767597 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 29,1999)
(diabetes).
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Following the Supreme Court's lead, the post-Sutton decisions
primarily focus on the positive aspects of the corrective device,
downplaying the impact of the negative side effects resulting from
the corrective measure." 8 Indeed, courts have narrowly construed
the disabling corrections corollary in such a way as to render it
largely ineffective for plaintiffs." 9
Often overlooked, however, is that Sutton is not limited to
individuals with correctable disabilities. Strict literal interpretation
of Sutton requires courts to assess an individual's disability status
even if the individual would not be disabled in their uncorrected or
unmedicated state. Because the post-Sutton cases have focused
almost exclusively on individuals with correctable disabilities, the
courts have neither addressed nor resolved the question of whether
the disabling aspects of a corrective measure can provide
independent grounds for disability status.1 20
As the next wave of ADA litigation begins, it is highly probable
that individuals who are not otherwise disabled, for example
individuals with minor back pain, will pursue ADA protection on
the basis that their medication or corrective device is independently
disabling.'' Faced with this unique question, the courts must
118. See supra note 117. The court's analysis in Sutton suggests that the side effects of the
medication pertain solely to whether it fully mitigates the impairment and not to whether
side effects are themselves disabling. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482. Courts have been reluctant
to find that the use of a mitigating device or medication results in an impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity.
119. Although the courts are correct in narrowly construingthe negative side effects ofthe
medication, this Note suggests that they are too liberal or illusory in their analysis of the
positive aspects of the mitigating measures. In order to avoid rendering the ADA largely
powerless in the workplace, and thus severely hindering the intended beneficiaries' ability
to qualify for the Act's protection, courts should continue to fird plaintiffs with correctable
disabilities "disabled" unless the mitigating measure fully alleviates the individual's capacity
in a major life activity.
120. In other words, can an individual with a nondisabling physical or mental impairment
gain protection from the ADA due exclusively to the negative side effects of medication?
121. Due to the recency of the Sutton decision, there is minimal case law supporting this
hypothesis. One case, however, suggests that plaintiffs are going to pursue this new avenue
of litigation. In Marasovich v. Prairie Material Sales, the plaintiff, a concrete-mixer truck
driver who suffered from back pain requiring medication, alleged that his employer violated
the ADA by terminating him after he was involved in two accidents. No. 98 C 2070,1999 WL
1101244, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 1999). Shortly after his second accident, the plaintiffs
employer required him to take a drug test and submit to a physical examination. Id. at *3.
The drug test and examination disclosed that the plaintiff was taking significant levels of
Valium on a daily basis. Id. In response, the defendant notified the plaintiff that his use of
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narrowly construe Sutton's disabling corrections language to ensure
that only the intended beneficiaries of the ADA receive the Act's
protection.
Narrow Construction of 'Disabling Corrections" for Individuals
Not Otherwise Disabled
In the absence of meaningful case law interpreting the breadth
and scope of Sutton's disabling corrections corollary, it is imperative
to look at the findings and purpose of the ADA, and to the
underlying aspects of the Sutton decision, to determine whether the
negative side effects of a corrective device can provide an
independent basis for disability status.122 Each of these methods of
analysis suggests that the proper interpretation of the disabling
corrections corollary is a narrow one. 2 ' Moreover, they suggest that
individuals who are not otherwise disabled were not the intended
beneficiaries of the Act.
Findings and Purpose of the ADA'
Congress enacted the ADA in 1990 "to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrim-
the Valium disqualified him from driving his truck and that if he wished to continue his
employment, he would be required to stop taking the medication. Id. at *3-4. After refusing
to stop taking his medication, the defendant terminated the plaintiff. Id. at *4. The court
denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment and found that there was a genuine
issue as to whether the plaintiff was a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA.
Id. at *6. In particular, the court stated that "[a] reasonable trier of fact could find that [the
plaintiff's] back spasms, pain, and side effects of some of his medication substantially limited
his ability to work as a truck driver." Id.
Although the court lumped the side effects together with the plaintiffs physical
impairment, it is highly unlikely that an individual with back spasms would be considered
disabled under the ADA's definition of disability. See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying
text (detailing the ADA definition of disability). Therefore, this court implicitly suggested
that the side effects from medication may provide an independent basis for disability status.
122. In other words, it is necessary to inquire whether individuals with nondisabling
impairments, who nonetheless have potentially disabling side effects from medication,
require ADA protection.
123. See McGarity, supra note 8, at 1174 (arguing that "a generous interpretation of the
disabling corrections corollary would serve the larger goals of the ADA").
124. For a thorough discussion of the purpose and findings of the ADA, see Burgdorf,
supra note 21, at 434-40.
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ination against individuals with disabilities."'25 Moreover, the
Act sought to eliminate the widespread, pervasive discrimination
against persons with disabilities.'26 Indeed, prior to the Act,
individuals with disabilities confronted major "forms of dis-
crimination, including outright intentional exclusion, the
discriminatory effects of architectural, transportation, and
communication barriers, overprotective rules and policies, failure
to make modifications to existing facilities and practices,
exclusionary qualification standards and criteria, segregation, and
relegation to lesser services, programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or
other opportunities .... '27 Furthermore, Congress found that
"unlike individuals who have experienced discrimination on the
basis of race, color, sex, national origin, religion or age," 28
individuals with disabilities have "had no legal recourse to redress
such discrimination."1
29
Perhaps even more importantly, Congress declared that census
data and national polls 3 ° reported that individuals with disabilities
"occupy an inferior status" and are "severely disadvantaged socially,
125. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994).
126. Id. § 12101(a)(2). The fimdings state that "historically, society has tended to isolate
and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive
social problem .... "Id.
127. Id. § 12101(a)(5).
128. Id. § 12101(a)(4).
129. Id. The 1988 version of the bill included a statement whereby the ADAwould provide
a prohibition of discrimination against individuals with disabilities that paralleled the
coverage afforded in other civil rights legislation "on the basis of race, sex, national origin,
and religion." S. REP. No. 100-2345, (1988); H.R. REP. No. 100-4498, (1998). When the bill
was revised to provide coverage of public accommodations and telecommunications relay
services, however, the bill was modified to remove the stated purpose, and the present
finding was added.
130. The Committee reports accompanying the ADA catalog the many sources and studies
underlying their findings. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 6-9 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt.
2, at 28-32 (1990). The sources include: LOUIS HARRIS & ASSoCS., THE ICD SURVEY OF
DISABLED AMERICANS: BRINGING DISABLED AMERICANS INTO THE MAINSTREAM (1986); LOUIS
HARRIS & ASSOCS., THE ICU SURVEY II: EMPLOYING DISABLED AMERICANS (1987); NATL
COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, ON THE THRESHOLD OF INDEPENDENCE (1988); NATL COUNCIL ON
DISABILITY, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE (1986); TASKFORCE ONTHE RIGHTS AND EMPOWERMENT
OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES, EQUALITY FOR 43 MILLION AMERICANS WrrH DISABILITIES:
AMORALAND ECONOMIC IMPERATIVE (1990); U.S. COMM'NON CIVILRIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING
THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES (1983).
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vocationally, economically, and educationally."131 In a related
finding, Congress stipulated that "individuals with disabilities are
a discrete and insular minority."3 2 Therefore, they would qualify as
a suspect classification for equal protection purposes. 11 In effect,
this finding is a congressional endorsement of the idea that
individuals with disabilities should be subjected to heightened
judicial scrutiny under the equal protection clause.134
Although Congress intended the ADA to provide broad coverage,
the totality of the congressional findings emphatically endorses a
narrow construction of the disabling corrections corollary.
35
Undoubtedly, the ADA was intended to encourage and enable
individuals with disabilities to become active members of our
society. The Act's broad coverage, however, targeted a specific class
of individuals: individuals that were disadvantaged 3 ' economically,
socially, and vocationally, occupying an inferior status in society.
Congress even boldly suggested that the intended beneficiaries of
the Act should be considered a suspect class, warranting heightened
judicial scrutiny.
131. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(6).
132. Id. § 12101(a)(7). Relying on Supreme Court equal protection litigation, Congress
described individuals with disabilities as
a discrete and insular minority who have been faced with restrictions and
limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and
relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society, based on
characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting
from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of
such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society ....
Id.
133. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)
(discussing scrutiny for suspect classifications).
134. For a similar argument, see Burgdorf, supra note 21, at 436. Although inconclusive,
it appears that the Supreme Court has rejected "suspect" classification for individuals with
disabilities. Id. In particular, the Supreme Court held that a mentally retarded individual
did not receive heightened judicial scrutiny warranted for individuals in suspect
classifications. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,442 (1985).
135. But see McGarity, supra note 8, at 1174 (arguing that a generous interpretation of
the disabling corrections corollary would best serve the ADA's goals).
136. In testimony to the United States Senate, the President of Louis Harris and
Associates documented a high correlation of disability with poverty, joblessness, lack of
education, and failure to participate in social life. See Joint Hearing on the Guaranteed Job
Opportunity Act Before the Senate Comm. On Labor and Human Res., S. Hrg. 100-166, pt.
2, at 9 (1987); see also S. REP. No. 101-116, at 8 (1989) (quoting the testimony).
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Surely individuals with minor physical or mental impairments,
who subsequently have negative side effects from medication,
are not deserving of suspect classification. Moreover, those
individuals are not a disadvantaged class of individuals who have
suffered educationally, vocationally, or economically due to their
impairment. Simply put, extending the disabling corrections
corollary to individuals who are not otherwise disabled would result
in protecting a class of plaintiffs who were never intended to receive
the Act's protections.
Policy Rationale of Sutton
The narrow approach to the disabling corrections corollary is also
supported by Sutton itself. In particular, the two primary
arguments in favor of mitigating measures analysis are consistent
with a narrow interpretation of the disabling corrections corollary.
First, Sutton's reliance on a present impairment l.. inherently limits
the application of the disabling corrections corollary. Assessing
whether an individual is presently limited in a major life activity
due to side effects from medication is incredibly complicated
because the side effects of drug treatments are frequently of
uncertain severity or duration. '38 In addition, "[m ] any of these [side]
effects decrease with time as an individual's body adjusts or as an
individual's physician adjusts the dosage of the medication .... 139
Acceptance of an expansive approach to the disabling corrections
corollary, therefore, would arguably result in a situation where an
individual's ADA protection fluctuates depending upon how well his
physician can control the side effects of his medication. Although
the ADA is based on a pro-work policy, the adoption of the disabling
corrections analysis for individuals not otherwise disabled would be
incredibly taxing on both the employer and the courts. 4 ° Therefore,
137. For a discussion of Sutton's reliance on a present, not potential or hypothetical
impairment, see supra note 74 and accompanying text.
138. See, e.g., MERCK MANUAL OF MEDICAL INFORMATION 42 (Robert Berkow et. al. eds.,
1997) (explaining that adverse drug reactions are common and vary in both duration and
severity).
139. McGarity, supra note 8, at 1179.
140. The adoption of an expansive approach to disabling corrections, as prescribed by
McGarity, id., would burden the courts with determining not only whether the underlying
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although the acceptance of the narrow approach to disabling
corrections has the potential to infringe upon the autonomy of
individuals with minor (nondisabling) impairments, it is justified
in part by the burden an expansive approach would place on both
the employer and the courts.
Moreover, the EEOC regulations support this position. In
particular, when determining whether an individual is disabled, the
EEOC regulations suggest three factors to consider: (1) "[tlhe
nature and the severity of the impairment;" (2) "[tlhe duration ...
of the impairment;" and (3) the "long term impact" of the
impairment. 41 The EEOC technical assistance manual for the ADA
further stipulates that temporary, nonchronic impairments that do
not have a lasting duration and have little or no long-term impact
usually are not disabilities.'42 The EEOC guidelines, coupled with
Sutton's reliance on a present impairment, suggest that courts
should limit the disabling corrections corollary because only
especially severe, lasting side effects of medical treatments would
justify disability status. Even in the cases of severe side effects,
however, the courts should refrain from engaging in disabling
corrections analysis when the individual is not otherwise disabled
because the marginal benefit of such analysis is marred by the
potential for confusion and inconsistency among the courts.
143
Second, a narrow interpretation of the disabling corrections
corollary is consistent with Sutton's interpretation of the
congressional findings. In Sutton, the Supreme Court held that
adopting the EEOC approach-considering individuals in the
impairment is a "disability," but also whether side effects from a corrective device or
medication substantially limit a major life activity. Requiring this further analysis
substantially increases the complexity of the litigation, and provides only marginal value.
141. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2) (2001).
142. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMIf'N,ATECHNICALASSIsTANCE MANUAL
ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE I) OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT §
2.2(a)(iii) (1992).
143. The increased complexity is minimized, and therefore justified, in cases where the
individual has a correctable disability. In those cases, the court is only looking to determine
if the mitigating measure fully alleviates the disabling impairment. As such, the court
examines the totality of the corrective device's impact, both positive and negative, to
determine if the individual is disabled. If the corrective device has significant negative side
effects, then it is unlikely to fully compensate for the underlying disability and the individual
will continue to be entitled to ADA protection.
20021 1289
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
absence of mitigating measures-would inevitably result in
coverage for 160 million individuals, a number much higher than
the 43 million cited in the ADA's findings.' Although the specific
source of the 43 million figure was not clear to the Court,145 the
majority relied on the figure to identify the group that Congress
intended to protect by enacting the ADA. Given the Court's
deference to these congressional findings, it follows that the
other congressional findings, supported by weightier statistical
information,146 would likewise be followed and the disabling
corrections corollary would not be found to be an independent basis
for disability status.' 47
Moreover, the Court's adoption of the 43 million figure illustrates
its desire to minimize trivial, unwarranted ADA litigation.48 The
Court's underlying goal of diminishing trivial ADA suits is also best
served by allowing disabling corrections analysis for individuals
with correctable disabilities, while rejecting the analysis for
individuals with nondisabling impairments. This approach better
facilitates both the Supreme Court's and ADA's goals because it
eliminates litigation involving individuals who were never the
intended beneficiaries of the Act, while enabling courts to assess
disabled individuals in their corrected state.149
REGULATORY REFORM AND JUDIcIAL DEFERENCE
As described above, the provisions of the EEOC's title I
regulations emphasize that the nature and severity, duration, and
long-term impact of an impairment are determinative factors in
144. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1994); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 487
(1999).
145. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 484.
146. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
147. For a discussion of this issue, see supra notes 124-36 and accompanying text.
148. The Court noted that the number of individuals withvision impairments alone is 100
million. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 487.
149. Accepting a broad interpretation ofthe disabling corrections corollary would burden
courts with litigation that did not exist prior to Sutton. In Sutton the Supreme Court was not
attempting to create a new means of ADA protection. Rather, the Court was striving to
resolve a split among the Circuits as to whether mitigating measures should be evaluated
in cases where the plaintiffhas a correctable disability.
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assessing an individual's disability status.' Sutton suggests,
however, that courts relax their analysis of the "duration" and
"long-term impact" requirements to facilitate analysis of mitigating
measures. Because this has the potential to completely read these
two critical elements out of the EEOC regulations, an amendment151
to those regulations is required to encourage courts to give the
disabling corrections corollary the narrow scope that both the ADA's
findings and the Supreme Court's Sutton opinion require. 152
The EEOC's title I regulations pertaining to the term
"substantially limits" should be amended to clarify the role that
Sutton's disabling correction language should play in the courts'
analysis of whether an individual has a disability.'53 In particular,
the amendment should require the courts to distinguish between
two classifications of plaintiffs, those with correctable disabilities,
and those with nondisabling impairments. After making such a
determination, the courts should be allowed to engage in disabling
corrections analysis for the individuals with correctable disabilities,
while being precluded from engaging in such analysis for
individuals with nondisabling impairments. For example, the new
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2) could read as follows:
150. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
151. There is some evidence that the EEOC would be receptive to amendments of their
regulations. In a statement following Sutton, Peggy R. Mastroianni, associate legal counsel
for the EEOC, stated that the Supreme Court's decision confused employers because it
unsettled an area of the ADA that was largely stable, and has made them question what
should be considered a disability. Peggy R. Mastroianni, Americans with Disabilities,
CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY BY FEDERAL DOCUMENT CLEARING HOUSE, July 26, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 23832034. Moreover, Mastroianni believes that this confusion calls for
more technical assistance from the EEOC. Id.
152. In light of Sutton, even some of the original drafters of the ADA called for reform. See
Bruce Rubenstein, Supreme Court Narrows the ADA Definition of Disability: Corrected
Disabilities Don't Count, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 1999, at 1 (articulating that Professor
Chai R. Feidblum of Georgetown University, one of the drafters of the Act, called on
Congress to remedy the Supreme Court's decision in Sutton).
153. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(2) (2001). This section currently reads as follows:
(2) The following factors should be considered in determining whether an
individual is substantially limited in a major life activity:
i) The nature and severity of the impairment;
(ii) The duration or expected duration of the impairment; and
(iii) The permanent or long-term impact, or the expected permanent or long
term impact of or resulting from an impairment.
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(2) Determining whether an individual is substantially limited
in a major life activity requires a threshold assessment of
whether the individual suffers from an impairment that would
be disabling in its unmitigated or uncorrected state. If the
individual's impairment is not independently disabling in its
uncorrected state, then the impairment does not necessitate the
assessment of the side effects, either positive or negative, of the
mitigating measure. If, however, the impairment is
independently disabling, the court should consider the following
factors: (i) The nature and severity of the impairment in its
mitigated state; (ii) The duration or expected duration of the
permanent impairment in its mitigated state; and (iii) The
permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or
long term impact of or resulting from the impairment in its
mitigated state.
In essence, the disabling corrections corollary would be extended
to those individuals who are suffering from correctable disabilities,
while at the same time eliminating the disabling corrections
analysis for individuals who are not otherwise disabled. This
amendment is consistent with the findings and purpose of the ADA,
as well as with Sutton, because it encourages individuals with
disabling impairments to attempt to alleviate their impacts by
pursuing ameliorative measures, and ensures that only the
intended beneficiaries of the Act receive its protection.
Judicial Deference Needed
The success of the amended EEOC regulation depends on judicial
deference. Nevertheless, some commentators argue that "[tihe
efficacy of a strategy that focuses on changes to the definitional
portions of the EEOC regulations may be somewhat doubtful in
light of the language in Sutton questioning the deference due those
regulations and the apparent 'judicial uprising' against the EEOC's
ADA regulations."'54 A closer reading of Sutton, however, suggests
154. McGarity, supra note 8, at 1189 (footnote omitted). But see Taylorv. Phoenixville Sch.
Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 307 (1999) ("The [Supreme] Court concluded that it did not have to
resolve the issues of deference because the parties in Sutton did not contest the validity of
the regulations, including 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) .... Because we have previously applied 29
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that the Court did not dismiss the concept of judicial deference to
the EEOC regulations.'55 Instead, the Court held that the EEOC
interpretive guidelines should not be followed in Sutton because
they contradicted the explicit language of the ADA and therefore
were an "impermissible interpretation of the [Act]. " 156
In the absence of regulations contradicting the plain language of
the statute, the Supreme Court has long recognized the principle of
judicial deference to agency action. 57 In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Court held:
[When] Congress has not directly addressed the precise question
at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction
on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the
court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute. 158
The proposed, amended regulations rectify what the Court deemed
an "impermissible interpretation" of the statute and therefore
would demand judicial deference. Specifically, the proposed new
regulations incorporate Sutton's mitigating measures approach for
individuals with correctable disabilities and therefore are a
permissible interpretation of the ADA.
Moreover, it is not necessary for the court to conclude that the
agency's construction is the only reasonable interpretation, or that
the court would have reached the same conclusion.' 59 Instead,
judicial deference to agency regulations is mandated if the agency's
interpretation is reasonable and not contrary to congressional
C.F.R. § 1630.2(j), we will follow it here .... ") (citation omitted).
155. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 481-84 (1999).
156. Id. at 482 (citations omitted). Ten years earlier, the Court maintained that "no
deference is due to agency interpretations at odds with the plain language of the statute
itself." Public Employees Ret. Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 171 (1989). In Sutton, the Court
reasoned that the phrase "substantially limits one or more of the major life activities" could
not possibly support the EEOC guidelines because the present indicative verb form requires
assessing individuals in their mitigated state. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
157. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
158. Id. at 843.
159. See Kamlholz, supra note 41, at 110. For additional discussion of agency deference
pursuant to Chevron, see Bridges, supra note 41, at 1071-76; Puma, supra note 48, at 140-45.
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intent.16 Applied to the disabling corrections corollary, the question
becomes: Is the limitation of the disabling corrections approach
to individuals with correctable disabilities a reasonable inter-
pretation of the ADA? Clearly the answer is "yes." The Court
decided Sutton in the midst of controversy concerning whether
mitigating measures should be considered in cases involving
plaintiffs with correctable disabilities. The intent of Sutton was not
to create a new avenue for creative plaintiffs, but rather to restrict
ADA litigation. Consequently it seems abundantly clear that the
modified regulations, which also support a narrowing of ADA
litigation, are reasonable. Additionally, as both Sutton and the Act
itself are silent concerning the scope of the disabling corrections
corollary, judicial deference to agency interpretation is warranted.
Finally, the modified regulations do not contradict congressional
intent. The congressional findings clearly suggest that the
intended beneficiaries of the Act are a "discrete and insular
minority" who have been subjected to a "history of purposeful
unequal treatment." 161 Individuals with minor, nondisabling
impairments, but who subsequently have disabling side effects as
a result of their treatment, are not deserving of the Act's protection.
Furthermore, the legislative intent, although rejected by Sutton,
also suggests that negative side effects from medication should not
lead to ADA protection.
1 2
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Sutton has provoked the popular
press, and many legal scholars, to question the breadth and scope
of the ADA. At the heart of its decision, the Supreme Court held
that the individualized inquiry demanded by the ADA requires
courts to evaluate individuals in their corrected or medicated state.
At first blush, this decision seems to resolve the question
concerning mitigating measures. A closer look, however, suggests
that Sutton may just be the tip of the iceberg, opening the door to
160. Bridges, supra note 41, at 1071.
161. As intended by 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1994).
162. For a discussion of the Committee Reports supporting the enactment of the ADA, see
supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
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additional ADA litigation by individuals suffering from disabling
corrections.
Both the lower courts' interpretations and the EEOC's reaction
to Sutton's disabling corrections corollary will greatly impact the
future of ADA litigation. If the lower courts interpret Sutton
expansively, thereby allowing disabling side effects to become an
independent means of ADA protection, a pandora's box of ADA
litigation will be opened. On the contrary, if the lower courts
carefully read Sutton, and correctly interpret the disabling
corrections corollary, then the side effects of mitigating measures
should be considered only for individuals who would be disabled in
the absence of the corrective device. This approach best serves the
goals of the ADA because it provides protection for only those
individuals who have been subjected to a history of unequal
treatment as a result of their significant impairment. 63
In addition, before the lower courts attempt to resolve this
complicated issue, the EEOC should offer guidance through the
promulgation of amended regulations. In particular, the EEOC
should articulate the importance of distinguishing between
individuals with correctable disabilities (like the plaintiffs in
Sutton) and individuals who are not otherwise disabled. Moreover,
the modified regulations should ensure that the effects of corrective
measures-both positive and negative-should be considered only
for individuals with correctable disabilities.
This narrow construction of the "disabling corrections" language
in Sutton is necessary to ensure that only individuals who suffer
from disabilities, and cannot fully alleviate the corresponding
limitation on a major life activity, receive the protections of the
ADA. Excluding individuals who utilize the disabling corrections
language as an independent basis for disability status is con-
sistent with the congressional findings and purpose of the ADA, and
at the same time fosters the pro-mitigation policy espoused in
Sutton. Most importantly, a narrow construction of the disabling
corrections language ensures that the intended beneficiaries of the
ADA are protected from workplace discrimination and can be self-
sufficient participants in our society.
Richard C. Dunn
163. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7).
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